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Abstract
There has been much recent work on the revenue-raising properties of truthful mechanisms for selling
goods to selfish bidders. Typically the revenue of a mechanism is compared against a benchmark (such as,
the maximum revenue obtainable by an omniscient seller selling at a fixed price to at least two customers),
with a view to understanding how much lower the mechanism’s revenue is than the benchmark, in the
worst case. We study this issue in the context of lotteries, where the seller may sell a probability of
winning an item. We are interested in two general issues. Firstly, we aim at using the true optimum
revenue as benchmark for our auctions. Secondly, we study the extent to which the expressive power
resulting from lotteries, helps to improve the worst-case ratio. We study this in the well-known context
of digital goods, where the production cost is zero. We show that in this scenario, collusion-resistant
lotteries (these are lotteries for which no coalition of bidders exchanging side payments has an advantage
in lying) are as powerful as truthful ones.
1 Introduction
We consider a scenario in which a “digital good” is to be sold to many potential buyers, with the objective
of maximizing the revenue. A digital good is assumed to be provided with unlimited supply and to have no
cost of production. Given a set of selfish buyers who may have diverse valuations for the good, a theoretical
optimum for the revenue (commonly denoted opt) is given by the sum of the buyers’ valuations.
In a standard mechanism, the allocation algorithm returns binary values so that a buyer would either
win a copy of the good, or fail to do so. Here we consider a more expressive class of mechanisms in which
a buyer i may be offered a probability λi of receiving the item; assuming that buyers are risk-neutral, if
i has valuation vi for the item, then i would have valuation viλi for the probability λi to receive it. The
general question we consider is, to what extent does the expressiveness of lotteries help us to design truthful
mechanisms that better approximate opt?
1.1 Model and preliminaries
We consider a setting in which we want to auction lotteries for digital goods [9], i.e., goods with unlimited
supply and no production costs. A lottery L = (λ, p) (for a specified item) is defined by its win probability
λ ∈ [0, 1] and its non-negative real-valued price p. A bidder with valuation v purchasing lottery L has utility
λv − p, i.e., his valuation for the item “weighted” by the win probability minus the lottery’s price.
The model is defined as follows. There are n selfish bidders, with true valuations v1, . . . , vn, who bid
b1, . . . , bn respectively. A mechanism (also called auction) is a pair (A,P ): A is an algorithm which on
input b = (b1, . . . , bn) returns a vector of n win probabilities (λ1(b), . . . , λn(b)); P (b) is a vector of n
payment functions, i.e., how much each bidder is charged to buy the lottery. We focus on auctions which
deterministically propose lotteries Li = (λi(b), pi(b)) to each bidder i; bidders buy the lottery if their utility
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is non-negative, i.e., the lottery satisfies voluntary participation. Given that win probabilities and payments
are deterministic, i’s utility λivi − pi is also deterministic. (That is, if the auction was repeated with the
same bids, each bidder would be offered the same lottery, and the auctioneer’s revenue would be the same.
For a buyer, there remains the uncertainty regarding the win/lose outcome of the lottery itself.)
As mentioned in the discussion below about related works, theoretical motivations for studying this
model of lotteries are related to the ones in [5] and [9]. From a more practical point of view, the lotteries
studied in the paper are perhaps better thought of as a model of uncertainty about what a buyer will
receive. For example, in the context of TV advertising, advertisers pay to buy an ad slot for which the size
of the exposed audience is uncertain but may be modeled with a probability distribution (via e.g. data on
programs’ audience shares). Also of relevance is Swoopo-style “recreational shopping”. We believe that this
model may suggest new kinds of sponsored search products, akin to TV advertising ones, that differ from
those currently used by search engines.
We aim to design truthful auctions (where bidders maximize their utility when telling their true valu-
ations). In this setting, from the definition of utility, it is immediate to see that we are dealing with one-
parameter bidders [2]. Therefore, according to the characterization of truthful mechanisms for one-parameter
bidders, we have to design monotone lotteries, i.e., lotteries for which the win probability is non-decreasing
in the bid. Moreover, pi(b), the amount bidder i must be charged, must be of the form [2, 10]:
pi(bi,b−i) = hi(b−i) + biλi(bi,b−i)−
∫ bi
0
λi(b,b−i)db,
where b−i denotes the bid vector b with all but the i-th entry and hi is any function depending on b−i (but
not bi). A stronger requirement is to demand collusion-resistant auctions in which any coalition of bidders
maximizes the sum of the utilities of its members when they are truthtelling. Collusion-resistant lotteries
are characterized in this context in terms of singular allocations. A monotone win probability function λi
is singular if for all i, bi,b
′
−i,b−i, we have λi(bi,b−i) = λi(bi,b
′
−i).
1 A singular win probability λi is then a
function of bi only. Goldberg and Hartline [10] prove the following theorem.
Proposition 1 ([10]). A lottery is collusion-resistant if and only if its win probability functions are singular.
We want incentive-compatible auctions which guarantee a good approximation of the optimal revenue
of the auctioneer. The optimal revenue is defined as opt =
∑
i vi for bidders’ valuations v1, . . . , vn. (For a
given bid vector b, we let opt(b) =
∑n
i=1 bi.) A mechanism approximates opt within a ratio r if the sum of
the payments collected from the bidders is at least opt/r. Alternative benchmarks for comparisons are used
in the literature, the most prominent being F (2) = maxi=2,...,n ivi, assuming vi ≥ vi+1 [9]. F
(2) measures
the maximum revenue achievable with a fixed posted price, under the constraint that at least two items are
sold. For F(b) defined as maxi=1,...,n ibi, with bi ≥ bi+1, it is known that F(b) = Θ(opt(b)/ ln(n)) and that
for all b, F(b) ≥ opt(b)/ ln(n) [9]. The focus on the rather technical benchmark F (2) is mainly motivated
by the impossibility to approximate opt reasonably well (cf. [9]).
The following observation indicates the power given by lotteries in revenue maximization. If bidders
are known to have 2 possible types, represented by a high valuation H and a low valuation L, then opt
cannot be approximated better than about H/L by any deterministic “classical” auction selling goods and
not lotteries. By contrast, if the auctioneer is allowed to sell lottery tickets with win probabilities of 1/2 and
1 respectively, then a bidder with valuation L would be willing to pay L/2 to buy the first kind of ticket;
similarly, a bidder with valuation H will pay H/2 to buy the ticket with win probability 1. The revenue of
such a lottery is then opt/2.
1.2 Our contribution
Our results are summarized in Table 1. When bids are known to come from a finite domain of size d, we
establish that the optimal revenue may be approximated within factor d, but no lower constant factor is
1Goldberg and Hartline [10] call these allocations posted-price mechanisms. However, we prefer the name singular as it
reflects better the semantics of the property in the context of lotteries.
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Upper bound Lower bound
D = {L,H} 2H−L
H
⋆
(Thm 3) 2H−L
H
#
(Thm 4)
D = {B1, . . . , Bd} d
⋆ (Thm 5) d− ε#, any ε > 0 (Thm 6)
D = [1, H ] lnH + 1⋆ (Thm 2) ln(H) + 1# (Thm 11)
Table 1: The bounds on the approximation guarantee of the revenue of incentive-compatible lotteries versus
opt as a function of bidders’ domain; the bounds marked by ‘⋆’ hold for collusion-resistant lotteries, those
marked by ‘#’ apply to truthful lotteries.
possible. Moreover, the upper bound of d is attained by a straightforward mechanism that is both anonymous
(that is, an offer depends only on an agent’s bid, and not on his identity) and singular (and so collusion-
resistant). Meanwhile the lower bound applies to all truthful mechanisms, regardless of computational
considerations. It is important to note that the lower bound identifies, for any d and ε > 0, a set of “well
separated” d bids for which no truthful lottery can approximate opt better than d− ε.2
The motivation to study two-value domains {L,H}, L < H , arises from the fact that one can provably
achieve the best approximation guarantee with respect to F (2) under this assumption [1] (see below for more
details). More generally, many real-life applications involve bidders with valuations from a finite domain.
Money is, by its very nature, discrete with reasonable lower and upper bounds. Similarly, auctions on the
web may collect bids through drop-down menus; the values available define a finite domain.
Regarding bids that may come from a continuous domain [1, H ], we obtain a tight bound of ln(H) + 1,
where again the upper bound is obtained via a simple collusion-resistant lottery and the lower bound holds
for any truthful lottery.
Our lower bounds measure the limitation of truthful mechanisms in terms of approximation guarantee to
opt independently of the number of bidders. Surprisingly, the best one can achieve when requiring incentive-
compatibility is in fact obtainable by mechanisms having the stronger property of collusion-resistance. To
the best of our knowledge, this is the first known case in which collusion-resistant mechanisms are as strong
as truthful ones. This represents, in a sense, a first positive result on (deterministic) collusion-resistant
mechanisms which have otherwise very limited power, as shown by the strong negative results in [10, 14].
Let us note that, regardless of the size of the domain, there always exists a bid vector for which F (2) = opt
(e.g., a vector of all L for binary domains) and therefore the approximation guarantees of our lotteries w.r.t.
F (2) do not improve over known results in the worst case. (Nevertheless, this is not surprising as our lotteries
are resistant to collusive behavior and not just truthful as the auctions designed to approximate F (2).) We
leave open the problem of devising incentive-compatible auctions tailored to approximate F (2) since our
main aim here is different: firstly, using opt as benchmark and, secondly, showing the equivalence between
two notions of incentive compatibility at different ends of the spectrum.
We use two different techniques to prove our results. The lower bound for continuous domains is obtained
by adopting a probabilistic technique designed in [9] to bound from below the revenue of universally truthful
auctions. These are auctions defined as probability distributions over deterministic truthful auctions. To use
the probabilistic technique of [9] we prove that there is a bijection between truthful lotteries and universally
truthful auctions. However, the technique of [9] turns out to be not flexible enough to prove bounds which
do not depend on the actual values in d-sized domains. Therefore, Theorem 6 needs the development of a
new technique that we introduce in the simpler setting of two-value domains in the proof of Theorem 4. (The
latter result can also be proved via the probabilistic proof technique given in [9].) Our new lower bounding
technique relies on the application of Carver’s theorem [6] which characterizes inconsistent linear inequality
systems in terms of certain linear combinations of the constraints of the system. Requiring to approximate
opt within a given ratio gives rise to a linear system with a particular structure; our proofs exploit this
structure to define a suitable linear combination according to Carver’s theorem. In setting up the system of
2The fact that the bids identified by Theorem 6 are quite far apart from each other explains why for D = [1,H] it is possible
to approximate opt within ln(H) + 1.
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linear inequalities we are able to “hide” the details given by the values in the domain and we can only focus
on the asymptotic behavior of lotteries. Technically less involved proofs of Theorems 4 and 6 would suffice
to obtain the corresponding results in the case of fixed number of bidders but would weaken the equivalence
of truthful and collusion-resistant mechanisms to hold only in rather limited scenarios.
Finally, let us note that due to the simplicity of our anonymous and singular lotteries, our upper bounds
hold also in the online setting of [12], i.e., they hold in a setting in which bidders come online and a decision
on the lottery to offer has to be made before the next bidder arrives.
Roadmap. In Section 1.3 we review the related literature and, in particular, compare our model with that
considered in previous revenue-maximizing auctions for digital goods. In Section 2 we give the straightforward
logarithmic upper-bound on approximability of opt through lotteries when bidders bid from an interval
[1, H ]. Domains comprised of only two values are considered in Section 3. The results in this section are
extended to any finite domain in Section 4. Finally, we consider the relation between our notion of lotteries
and the concept of universally truthful auctions in Section 5, and use this result to prove the matching lower
bound for continuous domains [1, H ]. Section 6 contains some concluding remarks.
1.3 Related works
This work is motivated by the results in [5]. Briest et al. [5] show how lotteries help in maximizing the
revenue when designing envy-free prices. Here we address a similar type of question and aim at obtaining
similar results for incentive-compatible lotteries.
Truthful lotteries defined above naturally relate to the truthful auctions for digital goods considered in
[9]. The authors of [9] show that no deterministic truthful auction can guarantee a reasonable approximation
of F and therefore focus on universally truthful auctions. However, they also show that these auctions fail to
guarantee any constant approximation of F (cf. Lemma 3.5 in [9]) and therefore the benchmark of interest
becomes F (2). They define an interesting auction called Random Sampling Optimal Price (RSOP, for short)
and prove that RSOP gives a (quite weak) constant approximation of F (2); they also conjecture the right
constant to be 4. Better bounds are then proved in [7, 1]; the latter work proves the conjecture when the
number of winners is at least 6 and in general for two-valued domains.
Our lotteries are deterministic, although a degree of randomness is given by the probabilistic nature of
the allocation. This random aspect can be seen to imply that our truthful lotteries are in fact equivalent
to universally truthful auctions (e.g., the lottery of the example above can be seen as an uniform proba-
bility distribution over a deterministic auction which charges L and one which charges H for the item).
Nevertheless, our equivalence proof also shows how lotteries can be seen as a (arguably more intuitive)
reinterpretation of universally truthful auctions (e.g., the universally truthful counterpart of the lottery for
[1, H ] domain involves a probability distribution over an infinite number of mechanisms). (See discussion at
the end of Section 5 for details.) Because of the aforementioned equivalence, this research can also be seen
as a continuation of [9] studying to which extent the knowledge of the domain helps in approximating opt
(e.g., Theorems 3 and 5 contradict the inapproximability result in [9], i.e., Lemma 3.5 therein breaks down
for finite domains).
Another related work is [10] which considers collusion-resistant mechanisms for bidders with domains
similar to ours. A characterization in terms of allocation rules is given (cf. Proposition 1) for randomized
mechanisms which define allocations, payments and then utilities in expectation over the random coin tosses
of the mechanism. Since in our lotteries we work with deterministic utilities (even, when considering lotteries
as universally truthful auctions) this characterization holds also in our setting.
A related concept is the responsive lotteries, studied in [8], in which a single agent reports his valuations
of a set of alternatives, and is awarded one of them, using probabilities designed to incentivize him to report
his true valuations (up to affine rescaling). The difference here is that we have just one kind of item, and
multiple agents.
Hart and Nisan [11] use a model similar to ours (risk-neutral bidders and lottery offers) in their study of
the optimal revenue when selling multiple items.
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Other benchmarks are defined in the literature to compare the revenue of incentive-compatible auctions,
see, e.g., [13]. To the best of our knowledge, our work is the first in which revenue is compared to opt.3
2 A simple collusion-resistant lottery
In this section we assume that the bids belong to the interval [1, H ]. We begin by proving an upper-bound on
the revenue guarantee by a collusion-resistant lottery. We define λi(b) =
ln(e·bi)
ln(e·H) , for any i and b. Therefore,
since ∫ bi
0
ln(e · u)du = bi ln(bi)
we have
pi(b) = hi(b−i) +
1
ln(e ·H)
(
bi ln(e · bi)− bi ln(bi)
)
= hi(b−i) +
bi
ln(e ·H)
.
Setting hi(b−i) = 0 (the value of the functions hi has no consequence for the truthfulness of the auction
given that it is independent of bi), we have that the utility of agent i, when declaring bi, is
vi
ln(bi)
ln(e ·H)
−
bi
ln(e ·H)
which is maximized for bi = vi. Since each bidder pays a fraction 1/ ln(e ·H) of his bid, the revenue of this
truthful auction is a (ln(H) + 1)-approximation of opt. Finally, observe that since λi(b) = λ(bi) then the
lottery is anonymous and singular and therefore collusion-resistant. Thus, we have the following result.
Theorem 2. There exists a (ln(H)+1)-approximate anonymous collusion-resistant lottery for bidders whose
valuations belong to the interval [1, H ].
We defer to Section 5, the proof of a matching lower bound for any truthful lottery and bidders having
[1, H ] domains.
3 Two-value domains
In this section we assume that bidders’ valuations are known to come from a 2-element set {L,H}, with
L < H . To begin with, we understand how to define lambda functions that lead to truthful lotteries and
maximize the revenue. It turns out that some simple lambda functions that correspond to anonymous,
collusion-resistant mechanisms guarantee a good approximation of the optimal revenue. We then prove
(Theorem 4) that functions of this kind suffice to obtain optimal performance, even amongst mechanisms
that need not be collusion-resistant, but just truthful.
We initially observe that by essentially the same arguments in [2] it is easy to show that a necessary condi-
tion to obtain truthfulness is that λi(H,b−i) ≥ λi(L,b−i) for any i and b−i.
4 For a bidder i with valuationH ,
the following truthfulness constraint must be satisfied Hλi(H,b−i)−pi(H,b−i) ≥ Hλi(L,b−i)−pi(L,b−i),
which implies that pi(H,b−i) ≤ H(λi(H,b−i)−λi(L,b−i))+pi(L,b−i). To maximize the revenue we would
like to set pi(H,b−i) = H(λi(H,b−i) − λi(L,b−i)) + pi(L,b−i). We next show that we can do that while
guaranteeing the truthfulness of bidder i having valuation L. Indeed, the utility of such a bidder when lying
and declaring H is:
−pi(H,b−i) + Lλi(H) = −H(λi(H)− λi(L)) + Lλi(H)− pi(L,b−i) ≤ Lλi(L)− pi(L,b−i)
3However, in certain combinatorial settings, such as the one considered in e.g. [3], opt, as social welfare, is used as benchmark
for revenue maximization.
4We cannot blindly use the results in [2] since the technical assumption in that work is to have the lambda functions twice
differentiable. This is not true for discontinuous functions, like the lambda functions for two-value domains.
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where the last inequality follows from (L −H)(λi(H,b−i) − λi(L,b−i)) ≤ 0. It remains to set a value for
pi(L,b−i) to guarantee voluntary participation, i.e., to guarantee that a bidder with valuation L buys the
lottery; to achieve this, we set pi(L) = Lλi(L,b−i).
From the above analysis, one could easily get an approximation guarantee of 2 by setting λi(H,b−i) = 1
and λi(L,b−i) = 1/2 for any i and b−i. However, it is possible to do better as shown by the next theorem.
Below, we let NH(b) (resp. NL(b)) be the set of bidders declaring H (resp. L) in b and nH(b) = |NH(b)|;
similarly, nL(b) denotes the number of L’s in b.
Theorem 3. There exists an anonymous collusion-resistant lottery for two-value domains {L,H}, L < H,
whose revenue is a 2H−L
H
-approximation of opt.
Proof. We define λi(L,b−i) =
H
2H−L and λi(H,b−i) = 1 for all i and b−i. With the payment functions
defined above, which guarantee truthfulness, the revenue collected by this lottery for a vector b is:
n∑
i=1
pi(b) =
∑
i∈NH(b)
pi(bi,b−i) +
∑
i∈NL(b)
pi(bi,b−i)
=
∑
i∈NH(b)
(
H(λi(H,b−i)− λi(L,b−i)) + Lλi(L,b−i)
)
+
∑
i∈NL(b)
Lλi(L,b−i)
= nH(b)H
(
1−
H
2H − L
)
+ nH(b)L
H
2H − L
+ nL(b)L
H
2H − L
=
(
nH(b)H + nL(b)L
)
H
2H − L
.
The approximation guarantee follows from the observation that the optimum is defined as nH(b)H+nL(b)L.
Finally, the collusion-resistance and the anonymity of the lottery follows from having defined λi(b) = λ(bi)
for all i and b.
Next we show that no truthful lottery can improve on the ratio obtained by Theorem 3. Lotteries that
are truthful — but not necessarily collusion-resistant — allow λi to depend also on the bid vector b−i. The
following result can be proved with the same logic in the case of n = 1 (where the vector b−i is trivial)
with a significantly shorter proof5; we show here that it holds for any number of bidders n. The proof
follows a simple structure. We initially upper bound the payments of a truthful lottery in terms of the
lambda functions. Then, for the lottery to approximate opt within a factor α, a certain system of linear
inequalities, with the lambda functions as variables, must be satisfied. Finally, we study the combinatorics of
the system and use Carver’s theorem [6] to determine the values of α for which the system admits solutions.
Theorem 4. No truthful lottery for two-value domains {L,H}, L < H, has approximation guarantee better
than 2H−L
H
.
Proof. Consider a truthful lottery which has approximation guarantee better than α ≥ 1 for a 2-value domain
{L,H}, L < H . By voluntary participation for bidders with valuation L we have
pi(L,b−i) ≤ Lλi(L,b−i). (1)
By truthfulness of bidders with valuation H , we have pi(H,b−i)− pi(L,b−i) ≤ H(λi(H,b−i)− λi(L,b−i)),
equivalently
pi(H,b−i) ≤ H
(
λi(H,b−i)− λi(L,b−i)
)
+ pi(L,b−i). (2)
Combining (1) and (2) we get
pi(H,b−i) ≤ Hλi(H,b−i)− (H − L)λi(L,b−i). (3)
5In such a case, the graph in Figure 1 would comprise only two nodes and then the combinatorics involved is straightforward.
(Moreover, n = 1 is of little significance given that there is no difference between truthfulness and collusion-resistance in this
case.)
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From (3) we have that for all bid vectors b,
∑
i∈NH(b)
(
Hλi(H,b−i)− (H − L)λi(L,b−i)
)
+
∑
i∈NL(b)
Lλi(L,b−i) ≥
n∑
i=1
pi(b).
Now, noting that
∑n
i=1 pi(b) >
opt(b)
α
= nH(b)H+nL(b)L
α
, we can rewrite this as
∑
i∈NH (b)
(Hλi(H,b−i)− (H − L)λi(L,b−i)) +
∑
i∈NL(b)
Lλi(L,b−i) >
nH(b)H + nL(b)L
α
.
Rearranging the above and noting that λi(H,b−i) ≤ 1 for all i and b−i, we have the following system of 2
n
linear inequalities:
−(H − L)
∑
i∈NH(b)
λi(L,b−i) + L
∑
i∈NL(b)
λi(L,b−i) > −
nH(b)α − nH(b)
α
H +
nL(b)
α
L for all b. (4)
There are n · 2n−1 variables {λi(L,b−i) : i ∈ [n],b−i ∈ {L,H}
n−1} in the above system. Notice that each
variable λi(L,b−i) occurs only twice with a coefficient different from 0: in particular, its coefficient is 0 in
all the constraints relative to a bid vector b = (·,b′−i) with b
′
−i 6= b−i; for b = (H,b−i), λi(L,b−i) has
coefficient −(H−L) since i ∈ NH(b); finally, for b = (L,b−i), the variable has coefficient L since i ∈ NL(b).
In order to prove the theorem we want to study the values of α for which this system has no solutions.
Towards this end, we let xi(b−i) be a shorthand for λi(L,b−i) and number all the possible m = 2
n bid
vectors b as b(1), . . . ,b(m). Then we denote by Γ(j)(x) the terms involved in the j-th constraint of (4)
relative to b(j), i.e.,
Γ(j)(x) := −(H − L)
∑
i∈NH(b(j))
xi(b
(j)
−i ) + L
∑
i∈NL(b(j))
xi(b
(j)
−i ) +
nH(b
(j))α− nH(b
(j))
α
H −
nL(b
(j))
α
L.
We use Carver’s theorem [6] which characterizes inconsistent systems of linear inequalities: according to [6],
(4) above admits no solution if and only if we can find m+ 1 non-negative constants kj , such that
m∑
j=1
kjΓ
(j)(x) + km+1 ≡ 0, (5)
with at least one of the k’s being positive. We next show how to define the constants k1, . . . , km so that the
two occurrences with non-null coefficients of each variable xi(b−i) cancel out.
To show how to define the constants kj we define a graph which has a vertex for each possible bid vector.
We put an edge between two vertices if the corresponding bid vectors are adjacent, i.e., they differ in only
one entry. Each vertex then has exactly n neighbors. This is a layered graph with n+ 1 layers. Let layer ℓ
be the set of all vertices whose corresponding bid vectors are comprised of ℓ H ’s and n− ℓ L’s. The graph
is indeed layered as by definition a node at layer ℓ only has neighbors at layer ℓ − 1 and ℓ + 1. For a bid
vector b(j) whose associated vertex lies in layer ℓ of the graph we define kj =
Lℓ
(H−L)ℓ . The construction is
depicted in Figure 1 for the case of n = 3. To show that this definition of constants cancels out the x’s in (5)
consider a variable xi(b−i). The two occurrences of xi(b−i) with a non-zero coefficient are for the bid vectors
b1 = (H,b−i), in which case xi(b−i) has coefficient −(H−L), and b2 = (L,b−i), in which case xi(b−i) has
coefficient L. The two vertices associated to b1 and b2 are by definition connected, with b1 being a node
at layer nH(b1) and b2 being a node at layer nH(b2). By construction, we have nH(b2) = nH(b1)− 1 and
therefore, letting ℓ = nH(b1) − 1, we have that the constant k corresponding to b1 is
Lℓ+1
(H−L)ℓ+1 while the
constant corresponding to b2 is
Lℓ
(H−L)ℓ . This means that the contribution of variable xi(b−i) to (5) is:(
L
Lℓ
(H − L)ℓ
− (H − L)
Lℓ+1
(H − L)ℓ+1
)
xi(b−i) = 0.
7
(L,L,L)
(H,L,L)
(L,H,L)
(L,L,H) (L,H,H)
(H,L,H)
(H,H,L)
(H,H,H)
Layer 0 1 2 3
Constant kj 1 LH−L
L2
(H−L)2
L3
(H−L)3
Figure 1: The graph constructed for n = 3.
Then, the following holds:
m∑
j=1
kjΓ
(j)(x) =
m∑
j=1
kjΓ
(j) =
m∑
j=1
kj
(
nH(b
(j))α− nH(b
(j))
α
H −
nL(b
(j))
α
L
)
.
We now study for which values of α the above sum is not positive.
Consider all the nodes at layer ℓ of the graph. We call this set of nodes Sℓ. We abuse the notation and
say that b ∈ Sℓ to mean that the node corresponding to b is at layer ℓ of the graph; we then rewrite the
summation above and impose it to be less than or equal than 0:
m∑
j=1
kjΓ
(j) =
n+1∑
ℓ=2

− ∑
b(j)∈Sℓ−1
kj
nL(b
(j))
α
L+
∑
b(j)∈Sℓ
kj
αnH(b
(j))− nH(b
(j))
α
H

 ≤ 0.
If the whole summation is non-positive, then there exists at least one layer ℓ for which the inner summation
is non-positive. The bid vectors b in Sℓ have exactly ℓ H ’s, i.e., nH(b) = ℓ and nL(b) = n − ℓ, and then
their number is
(
n
ℓ
)
. Moreover, all those bid vectors have the constant k set to (L/(H −L))ℓ. Therefore, we
have
0 ≥ −
∑
b(j)∈Sℓ−1
kj
nL(b
(j))
α
L+
∑
b(j)∈Sℓ
kj
αnH(b
(j))− nH(b
(j))
α
H
= −
(
n
ℓ− 1
)
Lℓ−1
(H − L)ℓ−1
n− ℓ+ 1
α
L+
(
n
ℓ
)
Lℓ
(H − L)ℓ
αℓ − ℓ
α
H ⇐⇒
0 ≥ −
n(n− 1) · · · (n− ℓ+ 1)
(ℓ − 1)!
L
α
+
n(n− 1) · · · (n− ℓ+ 1)
ℓ!
L
(H − L)
αℓ− ℓ
α
H ⇐⇒
0 ≥ −
1
α
+
1
(H − L)
α− 1
α
H,
which implies that α ≤ 2H−L
H
. This means that for these values of α, the weighted sum of the known terms in
(5) is non-positive. Therefore, there exists a non-negative constant km+1 which together with the constants
k1, . . . , km defined above satisfies (5). In other words, for α ≤
2H−L
H
, the system (4) has no solutions and
therefore no truthful lottery can guarantee better approximation ratios.
4 The case of finite domains
Following the same approach used for two-value domains, one could study three-valued domains {L,M,H},
L < M < H . With such a study, one would prove an upper bound of 3HM−HL−M
2
HM
(this is done by setting
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λi(H) = 1, λi(M) =
2MH+LH
3HM−HL−M2 and λi(L) =
HM
3HM−HL−M2 ) and a matching lower bound (for, e.g., n = 2
this is not hard to check using Carver’s theorem). However, we prefer to focus on asymptotic bounds (on the
approximability of opt) in terms of the number of allowed bid values in the domain, as opposed to detailed
bounds in terms of those values. That is the goal of this section. We begin by proving that it is possible to
design collusion-resistant lotteries collecting a 1/|D| fraction of the optimal revenue when bidders bid from
a finite domain D.
Theorem 5. There exists an anonymous collusion-resistant lottery for finite domains {B1, . . . , Bd}, B1 >
. . . > Bd, whose revenue is a d-approximation of opt.
Proof. We define the anonymous, singular lottery λ(Bi) = (d − i + 1)/d and the corresponding payment
functions pi(Bt,b−i) =
∑d
j=t Bj(λ(Bj)− λ(Bj+1)) =
∑d
j=t
Bj
d
for 1 ≤ t < d where we set λ(Bd+1) = 0. Let
us show that these payment functions indeed lead to collusion-resistance. We have to prove that for any
bidder i with valuation Bt and any Bh ∈ D:
Btλ(Bt)− pi(Bt,b−i) ≥ Btλ(Bh)− pi(Bh,b−i).
By definition this is equivalent to proving:
Bt(h− t)−
d∑
j=t
Bj +
d∑
j=h
Bj ≥ 0.
Now, whenever h ≤ t, the left-hand side of the above inequality is equal to Bt(h − t) −
∑h−1
j=t Bj which is
non-negative since Bj ≤ Bt, j ≥ t. Similarly, in the case in which h > t, the left-hand side of the above
inequality equals Bt(h− t)−
∑t−1
j=h Bj which is non-negative since Bj ≥ Bt, j ≤ t.
To prove the approximation guarantee we note that for all bid vectors b, we have
n∑
i=1
pi(b) =
d∑
t=1
∑
i∈Nt(b)
pi(b) ≥
d∑
t=1
nt(b)Bt
(
λ(Bt)− λ(Bt+1)
)
=
d∑
t=1
nt(b)Bt
d
=
opt(b)
d
,
Nt(b) denoting the set of bidders bidding Bt in b and nt(b) being the size of Nt(b).
We cannot improve over the above result even by relaxing the collusion-resistance to truthfulness, as
shown by next theorem. The proof of the lower bound below is not a simple extension of the arguments
used for two-value domains. Although the structure of the proof is similar, the difficulty here rests on the
fact that the layered graph is not adequate to model the definition of the constants required by Carver’s
theorem. Moreover, the study of the weighted sum of the known terms of the system is significantly more
involved.
Theorem 6. For any d and ε > 0, there exist bids B1 > B2 > . . . > Bd > 0 such that no truthful lottery
for the domain D = {B1, . . . , Bd} has approximation guarantee better than d− ε.
Proof. By truthfulness constraints any truthful lottery must satisfy the following upper bounds on the
payments, for 1 ≤ t < d. Recall that pi and λi map bid vectors to bidder i’s payment and win probability,
respectively.
pi(Bt,b−i) ≤ Bt(λi(Bt,b−i)− λi(Bt+1,b−i)) + pi(Bt+1,b−i)
≤ Btλi(Bt,b−i) +
d∑
j=t+1
(−(Bj−1 −Bj)λi(Bj ,b−i))
=
d−1∑
j=t
Bj (λi(Bj ,b−i)− λi(Bj+1,b−i)) +Bdλi(Bd,b−i)
≤ Bt(λi(Bt,b−i)− λi(Bt+1,b−i)) +
d∑
j=t+1
Bj ,
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where in the second inequality we recursively use the bound obtained on pi(Bt,b−i) to pi(Bt+1,b−i),
pi(Bt+2,b−i) and so on, and where the last inequality follows from the fact that 0 ≤ λi(Bj ,b−i) −
λi(Bj+1,b−i) ≤ 1 given by truthfulness and by definition, respectively. We let Bd be a positive value
and then define the bids of the domain to satisfy6 Bt
Bt−1
≤ ρε
d−t+1 , for 1 < t ≤ d, where ρε :=
ε
d(d−ε) and get
that, for 1 ≤ t < d, it holds
pi(Bt,b−i) ≤ Bt(λi(Bt,b−i)− λi(Bt+1,b−i)) + ρεBt,
since
∑d
j=t+1 Bj ≤ (d− t)Bt+1 ≤ ρεBt. We also note that by voluntary participation, we have pi(Bd,b−i) ≤
Bdλi(Bd,b−i) ≤ Bdλi(Bd,b−i) + ρεBd. We can now bound from above the revenue of a truthful lottery. To
ease the notation we set λi(B,b−i) = 0 for any i,b−i, and B 6∈ D. We then get
n∑
i=1
pi(b) ≤
d∑
t=1
∑
i∈Nt(b)
(
Bt
(
λi(Bt,b−i)− λi(Bt+1,b−i)
)
+ ρεBt
)
=
d∑
t=1
∑
i∈Nt(b)
Bt
(
λi(Bt,b−i)− λi(Bt+1,b−i)
)
+
d∑
t=1
nt(b)Btρε,
where, as above, Nt(b) is the set of bidders bidding Bt in b and nt(b) = |Nt(b)|. We now assume by
contradiction that a truthful lottery has approximation guarantee better than d − ε for the domain D as
in the hypothesis. By noticing that λi(B1,b−i) ≤ 1 for all i we then obtain the following system of linear
inequalities
d∑
t=1
∑
i∈Nt(b)
Bt
(
σtλi(Bt,b−i)− λi(Bt+1,b−i)
)
> −
d− 1
d
n1(b)B1 +
d∑
t=2
nt(b)Bt
d
(6)
for all b, where σt = 1 if t > 1 and 0 otherwise. For d ≥ t > 1, each variable λi(Bt,b−i) in (6) has only
two occurrences with a coefficient different from zero. Indeed, it appears with a coefficient of −Bt−1 in the
constraint relative to the bid vector (Bt−1,b−i) and has a factor of Bt in the constraint of (Bt,b−i). The
constraints relative to all the other bid vectors have λi(Bt,b−i) with a zero coefficient. Similarly to the
binary-domain case, we enumerate all the possible m = dn bid vectors, b(1), . . . ,b(m) and for each of those
we define
Γ(j)(Λ) :=
n∑
i=1:i∈Nt(b(j))
Bt
(
σtλi(Bt,b
(j)
−i )− λi(Bt+1,b
(j)
−i )
)
,
∆(j) :=
d− 1
d
n1(b
(j))B1 −
d∑
t=2
nt(b
(j))Bt
d
,
where Λ = (λ1, . . . , λn). By Carver’s theorem to reach a contradiction and show the theorem it is enough to
show that there exist m+ 1 non-negative constants kj , such that
m∑
j=1
kj(Γ
(j)(Λ) + ∆(j)) + km+1 ≡ 0, (7)
with at least one of the k’s being positive. We call these k’s the Carver’s constants. Akin to the proof
of Theorem 4, to prove (7) we first show that there exist Carver’s constants which make the sum of the
Γ functions equal to 0 (cf. Lemma 7) and then prove that these constants also annul the sum of the ∆
functions (cf. Lemma 9).
6Note that this is a feasible definition as for the meaningful values of ε, i.e., d > ε > 0, ρε
d−t−1
< 1 and therefore we are only
quantifying the “gap” between two consecutive bids of the domain.
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Lemma 7. There exist positive constants k1, . . . , km such that
∑m
j=1 kjΓ
(j)(Λ) ≡ 0 by canceling out all the
variables λi(·, ·). These constants are the same for all the bid vectors b
(j) that have the same value of ∆(j).
Proof. For any bid vector b(j), we define
kj =
B
n−nd(b
(j))
d∏d−1
r=1 B
nr(b(j))
r
. (8)
Claim 8. The constants k1, . . . , km are such that
∑m
j=1 kjΓ
(j)(Λ) ≡ 0 by canceling out all the variables
λi(·, ·) if and only if for any bid vector b
(j) = (Bt,b
(j)
−i ), d ≥ t > 1 and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, it holds that
ks =
Bt
Bt−1
kj , (9)
where b(s) = (Bt−1,b
(j)
−i ).
Proof. For the if part, note that by hypothesis k1, . . . , km in particular cancel out the variable λi(Bt,b
(j)
−i ),
1 ≤ i ≤ n and d ≥ t > 1 (recall that, for all i, we bounded from above the variable λi(B1, ·) with 1 and then
this variable is not in the system). As observed above this variable appears in (6) only twice with a non-null
coefficient. Specifically, λi(Bt,b
(j)
−i ) has a coefficient of Bt in the constraint relative to b
(j) = (Bt,b
(j)
−i ) and
a coefficient of −Bt−1 in the constraint defined upon b
(s) = (Bt−1,b
(j)
−i ). Then to cancel λi(Bt,b
(j)
−i ), it must
be the case that Btkj = Bt−1ks.
For the only if part, take Carver’s constants k1, . . . , km which satisfy (9) and assume by contradic-
tion that there exists a variable λi(Bt,b
(j)
−i ), 1 ≤ i ≤ n and d ≥ t > 1, that has not a coefficient 0 in∑m
j=1 kjΓ
(j)(Λ). Since, as noted above, this variable has a non-zero coefficient only in the constraints rela-
tive to b(j) = (Bt,b
(j)
−i ) and b
(s) = (Bt−1,b
(j)
−i ) respectively then it must be the case that Btkj 6= Bt−1ks,
thus a contradiction.
We then need to prove that our definition of Carver’s constants in (8) satisfies the requirement in Claim
8. Take two bid vectors b(j) and b(s) defined as in the statement of the claim. Since nt(b
(j)) = nt(b
(s))+ 1,
nt−1(b
(j)) = nt−1(b
(s))− 1 and nr(b
(j)) = nr(b
(s)) for r ∈ D \ {t− 1, t}, by (8), we get that
kj =
B
n−nd(b
(j))
d∏d−1
r=1 B
nr(b(j))
r
=
Bt−1
Bt
B
n−nd(b
(j))
d∏d−1
r=1,r 6=t,t−1B
nr(b(j))
r · B
nt(b(j))−1
t ·B
nt−1(b(j))+1
t−1
=
Bt−1
Bt
B
n−nd(b
(s))
d∏d−1
r=1 B
nr(b(s))
r
=
Bt−1
Bt
ks.
The proof concludes by observing that being the bids in the domain positive, so are the Carver’s constants
we define. Moreover, the second part of the lemma follows from the fact that ∆(j) is a function of nt(b
(j)),
t ∈ {1, . . . , d}.
Lemma 9. For the Carver’s constants k1, . . . , km defined in Lemma 7, it holds:
m∑
j=1
kj∆
(j) = 0.
Proof. By definition,
m∑
j=1
kj∆
(j) =
∑
n1,...,nd∈N:
n1+...+nd=n
(
n
n1, . . . , nd
)
Bn−ndd∏d−1
r=1 B
nr
r
[
(d− 1)
d
n1B1 −
d∑
h=2
nh
Bh
d
]
.
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Observe that for any 1 ≤ t ≤ d(
n
n1, . . . , nd
)
nt = n
(
n− 1
n1, nt−1, nt − 1, nt+1, . . . , nd
)
and then
∑
n1,...,nd∈N:
n1+...+nd=n
(
n
n1, . . . , nd
)
ntBt∏d
r=1B
nr
r
= n
∑
n1,...,nd∈N:
n1+...+nt−1+...+nd=n−1
(
n− 1
n1, . . . , nt − 1, . . . , nd
)
1
Bnt−1t
∏d
r=1,
r 6=t
Bnrr
= n
(
d∑
i=1
1
Bi
)n−1
,
where last equality follows from the multinomial theorem. Consequently,
m∑
j=1
kj∆
(j) = nBnd
d− 1
d
(
d∑
i=1
1
Bi
)n−1
− nBnd
1
d
d∑
t=2
(
d∑
i=1
1
Bi
)n−1
= 0.
By setting km+1 = 0, the theorem follows by the two lemmata above.
5 Universally truthful auctions and lotteries
Given a function f(b) we call f+(b) the right-continuous version of f(b) defined as
f+(b) = lim
c→b+
f(c).
where, as usual, c→ b+ means that c is approaching b from the right.
Theorem 10. There exists a bijection between truthful lotteries and universally truthful auctions.
Proof. Let (λ, p) be a truthful lottery over [1, H ]. Fix i and b−i and consequently to ease the notation write
λi(b,b−i) as the one-variable function λ(b). We show how to define the corresponding universally truthful
auction.
We define the function
δ(b) =


0 if b < 1
λ+(b) if 1 ≤ b ≤ H
λ(H) if H < b < 2H
1 if b ≥ 2H,
where λ+(b) is the right-continuous version of λ(b). (Note that λ+(H) = λ(H) as the domain of λ is [1, H ].)
Observe that δ is right-continuous, non-decreasing and that limb→−∞ δ(b) = 0, limb→+∞ δ(b) = 1. Therefore,
it is known that there exists on some probability space a random variable X for which δ(x) = Prob [X ≤ x ]
(see, e.g., Theorem 14.1 in [4]). In other words, δ is the cumulative distribution function of a random variable
X . We can use X to define a universally truthful auction that with
Prob [x < X ≤ y ] = δ(y)− δ(x) (10)
charges a price in (x, y]. Moreover, price z is a weak threshold (i.e., bidder wins by declaring at least z)
if λ is right-continuous at z, and strict (i.e., bidder wins by declaring strictly more than z) otherwise, cf.
Definition 2.4 in [9].
Conversely, starting from the cumulative distribution function of a universally truthful auction we can
define a truthful lottery by using the arguments above backwards.
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Note that the universally truthful auction given by (10) may result rather unnatural mainly because it
is not clear with which probability a certain price is charged. However, there are cases in which δ has some
properties for which (10) can be easily decoded. Let B1 > B2 > . . . > BT be the number of different prices
charged by the lottery for some i and b−i. If T is finite then δ is a step function and X a discrete random
variable; in this case, one can take the interval (Bj , Bj−1] and infer from the proof that the universally
truthful auction will charge Bj−1 with essentially probability λi(Bj−1,b−i) − λi(Bj ,b−i). In the case in
which T is infinite, with δ having a derivative θ which can be integrated back to δ (e.g., λ is continuously
differentiable) then θ is the probability density function of the random variable X meaning that (10) can be
rewritten as
∫ y
x
θ(u)du so to obtain an infinitesimal weight for the probability of prices in (x, y].
Finally, let us observe that the proof above holds for collusion-resistance as well when lotteries are
singular.
A Matching lower bound for [1, H ] domains. We can now move back to the case in which bidders have
valuations belonging to an interval [1, H ] with the aim of understanding how relaxing collusion-resistance to
truthfulness affects the approximation guarantee to opt achievable also in the case of continuous domains.
By using a lower bound technique developed in [9, 10] for universally truthful auctions and by relying on
the bijection between these auctions and truthful lotteries just proved, we can show that it is not possible
to achieve an approximation guarantee better than that given in Theorem 2, even by relaxing collusion-
resistance to truthfulness.
Theorem 11. For truthful lotteries and bidders bidding from a domain [1, H ], opt cannot be approximated
better than ln(H) + 1.
Proof. We show that for any truthful lottery L = (λ, p) there exists a bid vector b ∈ [1, H ]n such that the
revenue collected by L on input b is at most opt(b)/(ln(H) + 1).
To prove this, we analyze the behavior of L on a bid vector b chosen from a carefully designed probability
distribution. The outcome of the lottery is a random variable depending on the randomness in b and λ. We
prove that the expected revenue of L is at most a ln(H)+ 1 fraction of the expected optimal revenue. Then,
by definition of expectation, there must exist a bid vector for which the claim holds.
Because of Theorem 10, L is equivalent to a universally truthful auction A. The latter is characterized in
terms of a so-called bid-independent auction (see Definition 2.4 in [9]). In a bid-independent auction a price
is computed as a (possibly randomized) function of b−i only and offered to the bidder i. The bidder wins
if the price is bounded from above by bi. In the rest of the proof we will argue about the bid-independent
auction A defined upon lottery L.
Consider the bid vector b in which each bi is i.i.d. generated from the distribution in which Prob [ bi > y ] =
1/y for y ∈ [1, H ] and Prob [ bi = H ] = 1/H . Let Pi(b−i) be the price charged by A to agent i when the
bidder declares bi and the other agents declare b−i. Note that, since A is bid-independent then Pi(b−i)
is a random variable depending on the randomness of A and b−i only. Let Ri be the expected revenue
from bidder i which is 0 if bi < Pi(b−i) and Pi(b−i) otherwise. For p ≥ 0, E [Ri |Pi(b−i) = p ] =
p · Prob [ bi > p |Pi(b−i) = p ] = p · Prob [ bi > p ] ≤ 1, where the equality in the penultimate step follows
since bi is independent of Pi(b−i). Therefore,
E [Ri ] =
∑
p
E [Ri |Pi(b−i) = p ] · Prob [Pi(b−i) = p ] ≤
∑
p
Prob [Pi(b−i) = p ] ≤ 1.
We can then conclude that the expected revenue of A on the randomly generated bid vector b is at most
n. On the other hand, E [opt(b) ] = nE [ bi ] = n(ln(H) + 1).
6 Conclusions
We consider incentive-compatible auctions in which the auctioneer sells lottery tickets for winning the good
being auctioned. We aim at the design of auctions maximizing the revenue; the benchmark of interest is, in
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this setting, the optimal revenue, defined as the sum of bidders’ valuations. Although well motivated, rather
technical benchmarks, such as F (2) defined above, are instead used in related literature. We study these
auctions in the context of digital goods and prove the equivalence, in terms of approximation guarantee to
the optimal revenue, between collusion-resistant and truthful auctions (cf. Table 1). The former is a much
stronger requirement than the latter: it requires the auctions to be resistant to coalitions of cheating bidders
exchanging side payments. This equivalence is proved to be true in three different scenarios of bidders’
domains: binary, finite and interval [1, H ]. In the first two cases, the lower bound is proved via a new
technique to bound the revenue of truthful lotteries which we regard as our main technical contribution.
In the case of bids coming from [1, H ], the lower bound is proved by showing the equivalence between
universally truthful auctions and truthful lotteries and then applying a known technique due to [9]. The
proof of equivalence shows that the concept of incentive-compatible lotteries is rather useful: lotteries can
be much more natural to imagine than universally truthful auctions.
A number of questions are raised by our results. For example, it would be interesting to evaluate whether
the feasibility of using the optimal benchmark is due to the assumptions on the domains, or rather to the
expressiveness of lotteries. We believe that a study of lotteries in settings different from that of digital
goods can shed light on this important question. Notice, however, that moving from the digital good setting
may imply that we have to give up collusion-resistance in order to get any reasonable performance. Indeed,
consider a 1-item auction with 2 possible bid values {L,H}, L < H ; Suppose that λi had to depend only
on bid bi and not b−i. Since we have only one item available to sell, we need
∑n
j=1 λj(H) ≤ 1, from which
it follows that some j satisfies λj(H) ≤ 1/n. Suppose then that all other bidders have value L, so that
opt = H . All the other bidders would pay at most L while j pays at most H/n, so for H ≫ nL this fails
to approximate opt within any constant.
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